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I. Introduction
In the course of the last few months of 1955, the Economic
Planning Board of the Japanese Government made an attempt to work out
a long-range economic projection for Japan through 1960 along the
by-now-familiar lineso, It seems that discussions on economic policy
on a national scale are carried out more and more in the framework
of long-range economic models, and that even the problem of short-
run stability cannot be treated adequately outside some long-run
trend considerations. This line of approach to economic policy is
being adopted in more and more countries. On the other hand, it
can be concluded, for example, from the proceedings of sessions held
by the Conference on Research in Income and Wealth3 that there are
many problems of a conceptual and technical nature raised in
connection with long-range economic projection.
The purpose of the present paper is to discuss some of the
problems with which the Economic Planning Board wrestled in the process
of projection and to apply the test of consistency to some of the
Board's outstanding conclusions,
As notable examples, we may refer to Gerhard Colm, The American
Economy in 1960, National Planning Association, Washington, D. CO,1952, or Potential Economic Growth of the United States During the NextDecade Joint Committee Print, materials prepared for the JointCommittee on the Economic Report by the committee staff, 83rd Congress,
2nd Session.
2As for the Netherlands, see the press report in the New York Times,January 16, 1956.
3 Long-Range Economic Projection, Vol. 16, Studies in Income and
Wealth, Conference on Research in Income and Wealth, National Bureau of
Economic Research, published by the Princeton University Press, 1954.
2The specific economic dilemma faced by Japan is briefly discussed
in Part II and found to have influenced the assumptions and character
of the economic projection in Japan in a specific way. The problems
of the feasibility of goals and the stability of the economy is
treated in Part III Since foreign trade is the key factor in any
future development of the Japanese economy, Part IV is reserved for
more detailed discussions of techniques of projection and policy
assumptions relating to the international sector of economic activity.
II. Japan' s Economic Dilemma
The fundamental economic problem faced by postwar Japan is
reflected in a paradox: the co-existence of large-scale unemployment
and deficits in the international accounts. Under normal conditions
the co-existence of these two things would have been excluded by a
properly functioning price mechanism*
There is nothing peculiar in this situation insofar as this
international imbalance is associated with a strong inflationary
tendency at home. One notable fact is, however, that in spite of the
persistent inflation in the home economy, the large-scale unemployment
has not been wiped out. There are no reliable statistics on the real
scale of unemployment in Japan. The official figures of people who are
completely unemployed, shown in Table 1, based on the Monthly Labor Force
Survey, give a highly distorted picture of the situation. It would
mean, of course, making a caricature of the concept of employment if
all persons who were gainfully employed more than half an hour during
the relevant period should be excluded from the category of unemployed;
it is characteristic of the psychology of the Japanese officialdom
that they prefer to start from a very strict definition of unemploy-
ment rather than from that of employment, How far the figurcs of the
Labor Force Survey distort reality can be seen from the fact that
even the census of 1950, based on the same concept of unemployment,
showed 75,00o0 unemployed as compared with 430,000 of the Surveyo
The scale of latent unemployment was estimated by the Government 0 s
Council on Employment Policy at 5,760,000 for March, 195h, Some
estimates reach a rtuch higher figure, sometimes approaching the level
of 10 million, Clearly, this unemployment is not simply a result of
deficient effective demand,
On the other hand, it is obvious that the persistent international
imbalance of Japan cannot be considered simply as a consequence of a
price inflation, Despite the continually larpre import surplus in
the postwar period, Japan's international payienats and receipts could
be balanced only with the help of U3So aid amounting to 2 billion
Since the K(.rean war, this balancing function was taken over by the
special procurements and continued U, So, Army expenditures which total
by now more than $3 billion0 When in 1953 the import surplus climbed
up to the unprecedented height of almost 1 billion, the over-all
balance turned into deficit despite these extraordinary dollar receipts
of 1800 million, This forced the country to adopt a severely restrictive
monetary policy0  As Table 2 indicates, the decrease in the Uo S0 Artr
eroenditures was in 1954 more than offset by the improvement in the
trade balance, but there still remained an important gap of 963O miillinn
hAt the same time, even the official statistics showed a 55 per cent
jump in the size of "complete" unemployment. Despite a catastrophic
deterioration of home business outlock and an increase in unemployment,
it was not possible to balance Japan' s normal international payments
except for the temporary external suiport The international deficits
seem to be rooted more deeply than in the vagaries of internal infla-
tion and deflation,
Such being the situation, there is an apparent case for applying
here the notion of structural dis equilibrium The situation would
have been different if the classical or neo-classica3 price mechanism
(including a free price for foreign exchange) could work in such a way
as to correct the imbalance within a rather short space of time, for
example, by reducing wages relatively to the prices of capital goods
or by decreasing the internal price level relatively to the inter-
national market prices. But this disequilibrium can be termed as
"structural," precisely because such a readjustment through price
mechanism is not workable. Not only that the conditions would not allow
such an adjustment, but there is a persistent tendency toward inflation
which, if not offset by conscious policy, would tend to aggravate the
existing disequilibrium,
In the background of this hopoless situation, there is a serious
shortage of real capital. This capital shortage, in real. ter:s, limits
the level or full-capacity output, which is not high enough to catch
up with the flow of monetary effective demando The outcome is inevitably
an inflationary gap, On the other hand, unemploymnt in Japan can also
be explained by the same lack of e'quipnent sufficient to provide
employment opportunity for the growing labor f.'orce. If capital could
be secured from abroad in the form of impcrt surplus, the difficulty
would be bridged at least for a short period This is the reason why
under the present conditions, there is a strong case for capital
imports on whatever scale possible, insofar as this foreign invest-
ment does not add to the already existing inflationary effects in
the home economy through increased demand for scarce doestic resourcesO
Again the limited productive capacity at home would not provide enough
exports to pay for the essential imports, and no country can be assumed
to continue to live year in and year out on external aid or on temporary
dollar receipts, as Japan has done during the 10 postwar years,
The scale of such dollar receipts in the future will depend upon
many incalculable factors, with the course of international political
tension among themo It would be, however, highly irresponsible to
base the long-range economic policy of a natiocn on such a contingencyo,
It is the judgment universally agreed to by the great part of responsible
economists in Japan that the extraordinary dollar receipts should not,
at least as a matter of policy decisions, be counted on to continue
for long, It follows that it is now imperative for Japan to discover
a way by which the country can balance its international payments with
its own normal exports. The difficulty lies, of course, in another
requirement, namely, that this task should be achieved without causing
unnecessary disturbances in the home economy,
Perhaps the only possible solution can be found in increased capital
formation with the resulting rise in productivityo This means that a
6large-scale strictural readjustment is called for, since adjustment
through price mechanism is simply impossible or insufficient, The
need for structural changes inevitably dominates the task of economic
projection for Japan,
It is usually pointed out with specific emphasis that an economic
projection of this kind should not be intended as prediction, fore-
casting, or even less as blueprint for policy in . society in which
individuals, private business and democratic governments are free to
make their own decisions, At mos it gives, in Coim' s words, "a goal
which can be used as a guide in the -formulation of private and public
policieso" The use of the goal in this sense refers apparently to
ad hoc application of the conclusion drawn; explicit formulation of
policy is excluded from the inherent assumptions underlying the pro-
jection,
In the absence of structural disequilibrium, it can be argued
that this attitude is the only one which is compatible with the
private enterprise system,, But, I should venture to say, under the
present circumstances, there would have been little sense in merely
portraying how the Japanese econory would 'look at a definite point of
future time if the trend is to be extrapolated& What about the
pertinacious structural imbalances at that time? Should we accept as
inevitable that they still persist then? If estimates of future behavior
of the various basic relationships in our economic system are to be
G0erhard Colm, ibid ., po 11
7based strictly on our past experience, the disequilibrium observed in
the past would also be projected into the future picture Should we
not rather see to it that imbalances be corrected and readjusted
wherever possible? If so, in what way should this task be achieved?
What parameters in the economic system are to be deliberately changed,
and in what direction?
Here is the point where policy judgment inevitably enters even
the most objective economic projection. It is generally admitted that
even in the least biased attempt at projecting the future American economy,
some degree of judgment cannot be avoided. This is true to a much
larger extent in the case of Japan where more elements of planning are
involved from -t begimnnng in the very process of working out economic
models of the future*
It is not without deep meaning that in Japan even the conservative
government has taken up this line of approach to long-run economic
projection and has now incorporated the results into a so-called Five-Year
Economic Plan. Originally, the projection was made for the period of
six years, with 1954 as the basis year. But since the fiscal year
1955 has passed by more than half, the Plan is now conceived of as
covering five years, starting from fiscal 1956 (April 195t -March 1957)
and has been approvec officially by the Government on December 23, 1955.
Perhaps it should be called rather "Economic Programming" because
planning in the strict sense is far removed from the present Administra-
tion's conception of an economic system in which "individual and
private business initiative is honored a absic factor in economic
development and is subject to public control only within the necessary
limits." But in the face of required structural adjustments, it is
8considered essential to have a "comprehensive and long-run economic
program."t
One of the novelties of the Japanese Five-Year Plan can be seen
in that every year the Plan should be revised, with the target year
being transferred further into the future. That means that the next
year we will have another Five-Year Plan, which starts with 1957 and
ends with 1961, The plan has thus considerably gained in flexibility.
But it is also obvious that the projection has been given the definite
meaning of blueprint for economic policy, This ia understood to be
more than a prospect which might or might not be used as a guide to
policy0 In fact, there is a strong body of public opinion in Japan
which insists on implementation of the Plan rather than letting it
exist on paper as a mere prospective view.
III. Projection of the Japanese Economy through 1960
It is perhaps understandable in the face of these structural
disequilibria that certain policy goals have been set up in the very
beginning of the process of portraying the future potential economic
growth of Japan. The projection is, then, geared to what Kuznets calls
specifying' assUina6 that these fundamental goals should be
5See, for example, the editorial of Mainichi Shimbun, Tokyo,December 6, 1955.
Cf. Simon Kuznets: Concepts and Assumptions in Long-Term
Projections of National Product, in Long-Range Economic Projection,ibid., po 20O
9satisfied. These are principally two:
l arimum increase in employment7; it may be clear from the
above that the goal of full employment in any meaningful sense of the
word will not be attainable within a few years. The additional aggravat-
ing circumstance is that in the coming six-year period the population
increase is estimated at 5.5 per cent, whereas the labor force will
increase by 11.7 per cento It is, however, essential that the scale
of unemployment be reduced to the minimum possible level0
2. international balance in the face of virtual disappearance
of the "extraordinary" dollar receipts; it is assumed that these dollar
receipts will gradually be reduced during the first half of the Deriod
and become near zero or the minimum level of $100 million for con-
sumption expenditure of the U. S. Army personnel by 1960. If the
potential economic growth is to be achieved, this cut in effective
demand must be compensated by increases in other items; the import
requirements being equal, this will, moreover, call for a considerable
increase in exports,
The goals of international balance and high-level employment must
be, of course, achieved without even a temporary inflation For an
inflation would be incompatible with the strengthening of the basic
economic structure and the economic viability of the country In this
projection, prices are assumed to remain on the level of the estimated
1955 prices throughout the period,
7The official program calls for "full employment"-a term which
apparently is misleading in this context
Table 3. PROJECTION OF GROSS ATIONAL PRODUCT
1954 1955 1956 1957 1960
Population (in 1000) 88,350 89,260 90,170 91,020 93,230
Rate of increase 100.0 101.0 102.1 103.0 105.5
Population in Working Ages 59,660 61,010 62,350 63,640 66,830
(in 1000)
Rate of increase 100.0 102.3 104.5 1o6.7 112.0
Ratio of Labor Force (per cent) 67,8 678 7,8 67.8 67.8
Total Labor Force (in 1000) 40,460 41,370 42,270 43,150 45,310
Rate of increase 100.0 102.2 10L$ 106.6 11240
'l1l" Unemployment (in 1000) 640 640 600 550 450
ateof of increase j 100.0 100,0 932 85.9 7003
Total Employment (in 1000) 39,820 40,730 41,670 42,600 4,860
Rate of increase 100.0 102.3 104.6 107.0 11207
:utput per man per year 181.6 186.1 190,6 195.6 215.6
(in 1000 yen)
Raeo ncrease 100102.5 104 17.1 118.7
Gross National Product
(in billion yen)
Rate of increase
4
7,231
100.0
7,580
104.8
7,942
10918
8,332
115.2
9,673
133,8
I
. Projection of Total National Production
On the supply side, potenUal production depends principally
upon the number of people at workP the average working hours per day
or per week,, and the average output per man-houro Table 3 shows how
aetimates and assurptions of these factors are combined into a pro-
jection of GNP,
The rate of population increase tends now to decrease, but the
age composition of the population is likely to move in such a direction
that the ratio of workin!eage population, that is, 14 years of ", and
ove:. increases f rom 67.5 per cent in 1954 to 71.7 per cent in 1960.
Though the ratio of Labor Force to working-age population has fluctuated
in recent years between 65.0 and 70 8 per cent, it is assumed that it
will stay continually on the 1954 level of 67.8 per cento o difficult
question is to estimate how far unemployment can be reducedo Take
for the time being the unreliable official figures of so-called "full"
uremployment as a starting point and Postulate a gradual decrease as in
Table 3., the ratio of unemployment to the total supply of Labor Force
would be 123 per cent for 1957 and only 1 per cent for 1960o It is
perhaps unreasonable to assume -irtual full employment throughout the
periodi of course., the large-scale latent or disguised unemployment is
left completely out of the picturb, But iLf we accept for the con-
venience of calculation these figures, then it means that employment
will increase at a slightly higher rate than the population above the
age of 14 years0
It is also assumed that the average work week is throughout the
period maintained on the level of 46.7 hours, as in 1954, This meant,
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assuming holidays and vacations remain unchanged, that output per
man-hour moves parallel to output per nan-year, which is here taken
as measure for labor productivity. But what can be said about the
probable course of development in productivity? This is a difficult
problem to answer; the very structural readjustment which is called
for comes essentially to the same thing as the problem of how to raise
productivity through changed patterns of factor combination. Only on
the basis of increased productivity will it be possible to achieve
the potential economic growth' without inflation a nd international
imbalance. However, a rise in productivity is subject to limitation
by the speed of technological advance and supply conditions of equipment
and materials, partly imported from abroad. Moreover, the tempo of
productivity increase will also be damped down at least temporarily by
the necessity to absorb the surplus population as much as possible into
the production process* Though the modern techniques of production
cannot be assumed to be completely elastic as regards the proportion of
factors employed, there may be some case in Japan for adopting more
labor-intensive devices at the expense of labor productivity. So,
taking the tempo of the prewar progress and experiences in other
countries into consideration, it is assumed that output per man-year
will increase at an over-all annual rate of 2.5-3 per cent. This rate
is, of course, much less than the Japanese achievement in the postwar
period, in which the central problem has been one of recovery rather
than long-run growth. Nor can it be corisidered ea unreasonably high if
compared with the long-term growth rate of productivity as indicated in
Table h.
These estimates and assumptions give as a gross national product
of yen 9,673 bill.ion for 1960, or an increase of 33.8 per cent above
12
2* Projection of the Structure of Effective Demand
Estimating demand for any future period is perhaps the most
hazardous part of economic projectiono It inevitably implies to a
certain degree arbitrary assumptions, and these will involve a
difficult problem of subjective judgments.
The demand of government is assumed to increase proportionately
to the growth of GNP; only a greater emphasis is laid on the public
investment which will increase at a slightly higher rate whereas the
government expenditure of consumption character will increase less
rapidly than the national output.
Gross private capital accumulation, which amounted to 15.2 per
cent of ONP in 1954, is assumed relatively to increase to 18 per cent
of the 1960 projected GNP. In view of a housing shortage of estimated
2,840,000 units (April 1, 1955), the housing construction program stands
high in the priority scale of the government policy* In order to
solve the problem of shortage within 10 years, construction of 420,000
units in 1955, 434,000 units in 1956, 446,000 units in 1957, and 487,000
units in 1960 is plannedo Por this purpose more than 90 per cent
increase in housing expenditure from private resources in the period of
six years is contemplated.
But absolutely the main part of the incmrease in private capital
formation consists in a substantial increase in investment in productive
plant and equipment% its ratio to GNP will increase from 10.2 per cent
in 1954 to 12.8 per cent in 1960. The changes in inventories fluctuate
very widely according to the business situation, but we may have reasons
to assume that after a few postwar years of extraordinary high rates
13
of inventory accumulation the economy will finally settle down to a
normal relationship between business inventories and sales. However,
the estimate of -this ratio of 3.4 per cent in 1960 may be rather too
low in view of the stipulated high rate of income growth.
Current foreign surplus is assumed to decrease because of the
assumed reduction of "extraordinary" dollar receipts, which alone kept
Japant s international accounts in surplus to an extent that is
unlikely to persist in the future. In 1954, personal consumption was
63.3 per cent of gross national expenditure. To make possible a very
high rate of growth of nearly five per cent a year, savings must be
kept at an unusually high level, and the relative position of personal
consumption will be reduced in 1957 to 61.8 per cent of gross national
expenditure, and then in the final year of 1960, they will increase
slightly to 62.2 per cent. Nevertheless, per capita consumption level
will rise in 1957 to lC9.2 per cent, in 1960 to 124.5 per cent of the
1954 level. That means an annpal rate of increase in per capita
consumption of 2.9 per cent for the first half of the period, and
4.5 per cent for the latter half.
3. Changes in Economic Structure
One of the characteristic features of this projection of the
Japanese economy consists in the following: the projection is not
confined, as is usually the case, to estimates of the over-all scale
of economic activity, but the Economic Planning Board has attempted to
estimate in detail possible production and import quantities by major
commodities. The experts made preliminary calculations, starting from
certain specifying assumptions of Tpolicy goal; thie results were then
checked against the availability of required financing, of raw
materials to be imported from abroad, and against past and present
experiences, and the figures were again readjusted, The final
projection in detailed physical quantities is the outcome of this
process of repeated readjustment,
One of the leading policy considerations is that it is advisable
to make the Japanese economy as independent from foreign supply as
-ossible with the proviso that this policy does not come into conflict
with economic cost calculus. For instance, it is contended that in
the future natural textiles should be predominantly reserved for exports,
and home consumption should be satisfied by chemical and synthetic
fibers as much as feasible so that in 1960 the ratio of natural to
chemical fibers in home consumption should be 49:51, as compared with
the ratio of 64:36 in 1954
This kind of consideration affects deeply the projected structure
of production and imports. In spite of the expected increase in
population and income, for example, imports of textile raw materials
will, relatively, rather decrease; imports of food will increase only
in a slight degree. It was only on this assumption possible to keep
the ratio of imports to an exceptionally low level in this projection.
To this point I shall return latero
Without going into details, I should like, in Table 7, to present
the oicture of assumed changes in economic structure in the coming six
years. Broadly speaking, the over-all annual rate of growth of nearly
five per cent will be realized only when the secondary industries expand
at a high rate of 7-8 per cent, whereas the primary and tertiary industries
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lag considerably behind, with rates of growth of 3-345 per cent and
3.5-4 per cent respectivelyo In 1960, the output in manufacturing
industries will stand at 154, with 1954 output as 100, whereas
agriculture and fisheries will reach only the level of 120, mining 125,
services and commerce 128o The structure of industrial production
itself shows a considerable shift in favor of heavy and chemical
industries, On the basis of 1954 outout, the output of chemical industry
is assumed to reach the level of 178, engineering industry 163,
metals 155, but food processing and textile industries, with 136 and 127
respectively, will only increase proportionately with the increase of
exports and home consumption. Of course, it is implied that these
divergent paths of sectoral development are consistent with the over-
all rate of growth and, therefore, result in a balanced structure of
production0
As a result of these detailed estimates of production possibilities
in each major item, we have some kind of production target for major
items of commoditieso It is, for exuiple, quite remarkable that
production of cotton yarns should decrease from 972 million pounds in
1954 to 941 million pounds in 1960, whereas staple fibre and rayon
yarns should increase from 649 million pounds to 992 million pounds,
thus exceeding cotton yarns0  It should, however, be borne in mind
that under free-enterprise economy this kind of figure does not represent
any target of planning, The main levers by which the Government may
try to lift the whole economy are admittedly centered in fiscal policy
and rather indirect control of private finance, But the specifying
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assumptions adopted are apparently aiming at quite a new pattern of
economic activity and the stipulated tempo of growth is something
that is not to be found easily in past experience except in unusually
favorable periods, There are some doubts about the feasibility of
the program on the basis of the existing social system, or about the
consistency between the relevant variables in the economic system -
the level of consumption, saving and capital requirements, the level
of imports, etc0
IV. Y Fasibilit Consistency, and Stabilit
l, Over-all rate of growth and uncertainty
First, we shall ask the question: Is an over-all rate of growth
Aib GNP of nearly 5 per cent a year sustainable for a longer period?
It is true that in the past the Japanese economy showed a remarkably
high rate of growth of national income, perhaps among the highest of
of all economies except for those of strictly planned type. Table 4
shows the past record of long-tern annual rate of growth, eliminating
cyclical fluctuations, The trend value between the overlapping decades
was between 3 per cent and 5 per cent, As a representative long-run
figure we may use the rate of 4,5 per cent per annum worked out by
Masakichi Ito.8 This is a rapid enough tempo of growth, though much
slower than in Colin Ciarkv s estimate which puts the average rate of
the period 1887-1937 at more than 5 per cent per annum, and since 1914
nearly 7 per cent0
The data are admittedly deficient, and the further we go back into
the past, the less reliable are the figureso But so much can be con-
cluded from this time-series, as that even here a rate of growth
8VasakiiChi Ito, Caoital Accumlation in Janan, in Tsuru and Ohkawa,
adAn Analysis of the Japaniese Jcnm un Jpns) 93 1
17
of as high as 5 per cent was recorded only for the period of the 1920's
when the world economy enjoyed a rapid recovery and prosperity, With
the transition period of postwar recovery behind us, in which the
annual tempo of "growth" was also exceptionally rapid because of the
large recovery element, it is doubtful whether a comparably favorable
development in the world economy at large can be assumed to persist for
the whole period. It is not only the internal factors on which the
future course depends, but also external developments beyond the national
control loom large in determining it, To say the least, this program
of economic expansion is a very ambitiouas one, the realization of which
would require a rare combination of the utmost efforts of the nation
and the most favorable constellation in the external environment.
For one thing, such a growth will inevitably presuppose the
availability of equipment and raw materials which must be partly imported
from abroad. In the absence of unilateral capital transfer, increased
imports must be paid by increased exports,, Whether specific scarcities
or bottlenecks are likely to develop depends at least partly upon the
chances of export expansion, For a country of Japan's z'Osource structure,
then, the question of feasibility of economic expansion turns out to be
a question of export markets, In this sonse, it is obvious that the
world economy introduces an element of uncertainty into Japan's lon-
range economic planningn
One specific item of scarcities is the supply of energy which is
expected to be desperately short of the requirement; if we are forced
to develop internal energy resources more intensively because of foreign
exchange limitations, the inevitable re-sult would be a further rise in
18
energy cost which might further distort the economic structure in the
long run.
The central relationship in this kind of economic projection is
that of capital formation to the growth of output (the incremental
capital-output ratio), and this relationship is, as Hansen points out,
fairly rigorously determined by technological and structural factors
and cannot be arbitrarily changed by the planners.9 What is the
magnitude of investment required to sustain the postulated rate of
growth of GNP? Unfortunately, Japanese statistics on savings and
capital formation are still woefully inadequate, and in the absence
of completed estimates of real capital formation on the commodity-flow
basis, we are left with Masakichi Ito's estimates from the national
wealth statistics. These are given in Table 8. As can be inferred
from the table, the average capital-output ratio for the period 1913-
1935 seems to have been around 43 in Japan. For the same period,
net capital accumulation amounted to yen 38.5 billion, whereas the in-
crease in national income, yen 9 billion: this gives the incremental,
or marginal capital-income ratio of 4.2=-a figure much higher than that
of the U. S. A., calcuLat-ed: for example, by William Fellner. 1 0  In the
present projection, as we can easily check, a marginal capital-output
ratio from year to year is assumed to be in the neighborhood of 4:1;
so it can be said that the variables of capital requirements fcr achiev-
ing the expansion bear a fairly plausible relation to their past behavior,
9Alvin H, Hansen, On the American Economy in 1960, Long-Run and
Short-Run Adjustments, in: The Review of Economics and Statistics,
Vol, XXXV, No. b, November 1953, po 263,
10William Fellner, The Capital-Output Ratio in Dynamic Economics,
in Money, Trade, and Economic Growth, New York 1951, p, 131. Cf., also
William Fellner, Long-Term Tendencies in Private Capital Formation, in,
Longz=Range Economic Projection, ibido, p. 306.
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This ratio may came more easily within the limits of feasibility,
taking account of the oossibility that the production function may be,
to a certain degree, adjusted to a lower capital-output ratio. The
national income data now available seem to suggest that in recent years
the ratio has tended to be somewhat lower0
It may be of some interest to check these ratios against the
saving ratio estimates arrived at from other statistical sources. The
ratio of net savings to national income appears to have been within
the range of 16-17 per cent per annum over longer periods 1 2 If i
fit the figures computed by Ito to the well-known E-2st saving-
investment identity
00 "Z 17
Where A0 represents the rate of growth of output, the marginal
capital-output ratio, and oC, the net saving ratio, we arrive at
4.5 x 4.2 = 18.9
This means that the figures of the first two items should be somewhat
lowered or the saving ratio must have been higher than computed. It
is probable that both the rate of growth and the capital-output ratio
over longer periods have been overestimated,
1 1Cf. Economic Council (now: Planning) Board: "The Japanese
Economy and National Income," 19540 As for the capital-output ratio
calculated from these data, see Takafusa Nakamura, Some Considerations
to the Japital-Output Ratio in Japan, Social Sciences Annuals (Japanese),
Tokyo University, 1954o
12 Cf. Yuzo Yamada's unpublished paper, "Notes on the Income Growth
and the Rate of Saving in Japano"
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2o Test of stability
These capital requirements will be covered by private capital
formation as well as by public investment. At any level of output,
the planned private capital formation plus the Government expenditures
on goods and services must absorb the tax payments and the private
voluntary savings, In the context of long-run projection, of course,
the specifically cyclical behavior of planned savings and investments,
between which there may be fluctuating discrepancies, is left out of
consideration. But even if it may be assumed in the trend line that
divergences between planned and realized magnitudes tend to cancel out,
inconsistency between planned capital formation and expected voluntary
savings will inevitably introduce an element of instability over longer
periods into the projected economic models. Thus, we may ask the
further question: Are these capital requirements, estimated from the
assumed output trends and capital-output ratios,, consistent with the
flow of real savings that might be expected from the over-all picture
of national expenditure (via the propensity to save)?
Taking past experience as a yardstick, certain short-run fluctua-
tions should be taken into account in order to arrive at average
conditions which might be expected to persist over longer periods of
projection In Table 6, the figures of 1930 are included because that
year was typical of depressiono In Japan the years 1934-36 are usually
taken as the last normal period before the war: for in 1937 the country
entered a new stage of militarist aggression in China, But in taking
the conditions of 1934-36 as "normal," it is well to bear in mind that
they were rather years of rapid economic expansion. This may give
a welcome basis of comparison for a program that postulates an equal
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or more rapid growth in the future.
The starting point of our projection is 1954o In this year,
as a glance at Table 6 shows, Japan, after a period of postwar transi-
tion, approached fairly close to the situation of the prewar "normal,"
as far as the structure of national economic accounts is concernedo
There were, of course, some remarka.le differences: in 1954, Japangs
current foreign accounts displayed a surplus owing to the "e-traordi nary"
dollar rec eipts of $6O million; a larger proportion of Government
expenditures was devoted to investment, and the ratio of personal
consumption did not recover the prewar "normal" position.
Now the present projection proposes to increase the ratio of
gross private capital formation from 15,2 per cent of 1954 to 18 per
cent of 1960, while the ratio of consumption should be decreased from
63o3 per cent to 61,8 per cent in 1957 and 62.2 per cent in 1960o Is
this highly investment-oriented economy consistent with the expected
behavior of the critical variables based on past experience, under the
proviso that there will be no fundamental change in the economic system?
As can be seen from Table 6, this projection corresponds to an increase
in the ratio of net capital formation from 11.6 per cent of the prewar
"normal" years to 17.4 per cent in the target year, that is a jump of
50 per cent, Expressed in its relation to national income, the net
saving ratio was in 1934-36, 13.6 per cent, in the base year of the
projection 1954, 17,6 per cent, and this is supposed to rise to 20 per
cent in 1960. Except for the postwar transition period, when the high
rate of capital formation was supoorted by U0 So aid and "extraordinary"
dollar receipts, a rr-t saving ratio of this magni tudc. is seldom found
22
in the past for a long period.
On the other hand, what would be the probable behavior of personal
consumption expenditures in the stipulated process of economic growth?
It was only in 1953 that per capita consumption in Japan recovered the
pre-war level (1934-36 average) and there is still a large backlog of
consumers' durable goods. The standard of living (including not only
current consumption but also stocks of consumers' goods, consumerst
durables, and housing) has hardly regained the prewar position. There-
fore there is a persistent pressure to raise consumption. This was,
in fact, brought to the fore as a remarkable aftermath of the Korean
War0 From 1951 to 1952 the consumption level rose by 16 per cent, and,
contrary to the expectation, continued to rise in 1953 again by 19 per
cent. It should be noted, however, that this 1953 increase of nearly
yen 700 billion brought the ratio of personal consumption to GNP only
to 62.4 per cent, still belowz the prewar position of 65.4 per cent,
But this increase in consumption expenditures, together with that in
inestment, was sufficient to upset the precarious international balance
of the econoy .(cf. Table 2)o It app 'a that the upward pressure of
effective demand was out of balance wit. the capacity total supply, and
the stability of the Japanese econong was seriously threatened,
We shall follow the story into the next yearo The Government was
forced in the fall of 1953 to adopt a strong deflationary policy to
combat the inflationary pressure0 What was the outcome of that policy?
So far as the year 1954 is concerned, gross capital formation was reduced
by 17 per cent, but this was the only visible effect of the policy, and
despite the fact that a cut in consumption would have been pr'eferable
9
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to a similar cut in investment for economic growth, personal con-
sumption expenditure increased further by 6 per cent, bringing the
ratio to 63.3 per cent of GNP, This is where the present projection
starts, In view of this recent experience, it is hardly to be
expected that this persistent upward pressure in consumer demand
would suddenly cease to exist, provided the present tax system and
freedom in income disposal are preserved. In other words, the
projection can be said to involve a certain inconsistency with the
probable behavior of the variables in the national economic budget.
This will inevitably find expression in a shortage of funds
required for financing such a bold investment program. This will put
an increased burden on public finance, since the Government will have
to carry a larger part of investment responsibility than is assumed
in this program, To be realistic, the values attributed to the
Government sector would have to be revised, with the result that the
social distribution of economic power is shifted farther away from the
present pattern. This may again involve a very intricate problem of
investment incentive on the part of the private sectoro
We have found, in short, in the projected Japanese econon of
1960 a persistent bias toward inflation. That means: effective
demand tends to outstrip the growth of capacity output, and this
danger of inflation will be all the more threatening as certain kinds
of specific scarcities and instability may develop from the side of
the international sector, To this problem we turn nowo
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V. Problems of Foreign Trade Projection
1. Importance of the International Sector
In the typical tabulation of national economic accounts or gross
national product of any country, the international sector is summarized
by the heading "net foreign investment," or "current foreign surplus"
and this is so also in our projection, Of Course, its magnitude is
very small in relation to the gross national product, But everybody
will agree that this is not a correct reflection of the true importance
of the foreign transactions,
There is a general tendency in the national income accounts
to operate more and more in terms of "gross" concepts. From the early
period of the Keynesian economics when even in the government sector
only net figures of deficits were counted on, national income was
broadened to include taxes and other government receipts and expenditures.
Then, taking depreciation into account, we arrive at the concept of
gross national producto But this "grossing up" movement stopped short
of the foreign sector. Net foreign investment is simply equal to
exports minus imports0
One weakness of the macro-economic analysis based on "net" concepts
consists in the fact that it cannot cope squarely with the problem of
economic structure It can be argued generally that a national income
tabulation on "net" basis is not particularly useful for the analysis
of total economic process, because it is not capable of making the
relationship between flow and stock explicito And it is precisely
this relation that plays a central role in any structural analysis.
With respect to the inenationa t:ransactions, it is quite
gical to deduct imoorta r the prcess of &clcilation of national
roduct. But insofar as GUTP r-es as a measure of the scale of
economic activity, h less sophisticated reader would wonder why
imports must be deducted in order' to arrive at thise I think there
13 an elemnt of sond ins tinct in this mistr-ut of logic. After
all, for quite a number of countries, imports are a very important
source of supnly of goods i n general., and if we omit this source
from the beginning, we may fail to get a well-rounded picture of
economic activity, In this process of "grossing up," we arrive at
what Polak simply calls "gross output",1 3 :
Gross Output GNP / imports
home consumption / gross home investment
government purchases of goods and
services . exporta,
Qr, we may interpret the left-hand side of this equation as repre-
seiting total supply of goods and sezrvios which should equal the
total demand, or effective demand, composed of the items of the
rght-hand side,
This interpretation has at least one advantage in that it goes
one step beyond the usual macro-econoinic analysis.. Contr;ary to the
rconclusion drawn from the latter, imrorts annear here not as a
negative factor, but as a positive contribution to supoLy and, hence,
income creation., The Keynesian tyne of multiplier theory may be
13Polak, J, JO., Conceptual Problems Involved in Projections of
lt International Sector of Gross National Product, in Long-Range
hunoicP rojection ibd, po 380bi
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Table 11 CHANGES I TiE RATIO O IcJS TO NATIONAL INCOIE,
COIMPAREAD TO PPiAR EARS (in ercents)
Countries 1938 1953 j
United States 303 3.5
Canada 16.8 23.
Argentina 16,5 1 4 (1951)
United Kingdoa 1 22,7
France 127 169
Western Germany 6155
Italy io,6, 9
Switzerland 1, 243
Portugal 6 6 20,8
Holland 29c 46,,6
Belgium 3247 433
Denmark 5302
Norway 25,8 37 9
Sueden 16,6 20,8
Finland 28.7 201
Ceylon 39o7 36,4
Thailand 15'2 218 (1952)
Australla 17,2 13,7
eu Zealand 28,6 26a4
Japan 1.9,8 1 8
* Sourcet United NationsY h uel n f sta titca
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rise in the ratio as a consequence of diversification of output.
Only insofar as the growth is concentrated on the tertiary industries
oriented primarily to home market, the import ratio would tend to
decline, as the trend in the Uo S. A, seems clearly to in icateo
As a matter of fact, the relative importance of foreign trade after
the war has considerably increased in most countries, with the
exception of Australia, New Zealand, Finland, Argentina, Ceylon
and a few others0 Japan is among these exceptions. There has been a clear
tendency of trade in the postwar period to show a relative increase
mosty in the framework of some regional economic blocs, such as OEEC
countries, Sterling Bloc or North American areaol
In view of the fact that world trade has, since the war, taken
an "nmistakable bias t ward regionalism.16 it is understood that the
economic planners in Japan feel somewhat reluctant to make the country
more dependent on imports from abroad. Whether we deplore this
tendency or not, it is not easy for a country without organized markets
of its own to be exposed to violent fluctuations of world trade But
there are considerable doubts as to how far such an attempt toward
import substitution is economically justifiedo
15The cases of Australia and New Zealand may be explained by factors
special to this areao
1 6 This movement toward regionalism has been emphasized by H. van B,
Cleveland, co-author of The Political Economy of American Foreign Policy,
Report of a Study Group Sponsored by the Woodrow Wilson Foundation and
the National Planning Association, New York, 1955, in his testimony
before the Subcommittee on Foreign Economic Policy of the Joint Committee
on the Economic Report on November 16, 1955.
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Take, for example, the case of food imports. Now Japan is
dependent upon foreign food sources to the extent of 20 per cent of
home consumption, If the additional requirements due to the increase
in population should be covered wholly by external supply, the food
imports by 1960 would be greater by 2 million tons, or 0240 million
than now, But, on the other hand, if Japan is to be entirely
independent of foreign food, investment in agriculture is estimated
to absorb yearly around yen 500 billion, an amount which is bare of
any economic sense, Such a program of autarchy would be not only
beyond the limit of technical feasibility, but would have a catas-
trophic effect on Japan's exports to rice-producing countries in
Asia, The policy goal must apparently lie somewhere in between these
two extremiese And it is very important in the face of the steeply rising
marginal cost curve in may lines of essential materials that due
consideration should be given to economic calculation,
In projecting the need for future imports, great emphasis has
been laid on detailed analysis of the supply and demand situation
of a great many commodities. It may be presumed that this procedure
can lead to a more reliable projection of future imaport needs than
by a mere correlation of total imports with some aggregate variables
in national economic accounts, Provided that active policy is carried
out with the aim of adjustment of economic structure, imports of staple
food would remain almost at the saie level, that of textile raw materials
would decline relatively to a consid.erabla extent 9 whereas crude oil,
iron ore, scrap, would be imported in much larger quantity,
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Tabi 12. ANNUAL RATE in IE2R QU<'NTITIES (in percent)
A, Prewar Years
Years World Trade Trade of Japan
1927 7.9
1928 3,6
1929 5,0
1930 - 7.0
1931 - 8.1
1932 2.7
1933 101
1934 3.7
1935 46
1936 49
1937 12.5
1938 8,.0
11'7
- 71
26.1
3.1
4.1
17,1
9.3
20.3
15.7
10.9
3,2
8.1
B Postivar Years
orld Export
Qu"antities
Annual Rate
Change
of xport anAnnual Hate
of Japan,2 of Change
100
7L5
15.5 10o6.6
29,6 90.9
3114 61
314 0
35.3 12.h
46,3 3L2
1~ 100 = 100 - United Ntions ,thly Butlletin of Statistics
Years
1934-6
1938
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951.
1952
1953
195L
78
80
82
89
100
112
110
118
124
2,5
8.5
12.4
12o0
- L4
-36
I
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All this presupposes, of course, a high degree of conscious
tolicy measures, either by means of encouragement or control, and
they might come into conflict at many vulnerable points with the
most economical use of resources, A growth of GNP at the annual
rate of 5 per cent might make increased imports of some specific
materials necessary. After careful examination of the over-all
picture, I am inclined to suppose that the required ratio of import3
would tend to be rather higher than the calculated ratio of 11 per cent,
Once this happens, the availability of foreign exchange earnings from
exports would set a limit for economic growth in the form of speciftc
scarcitieso
S PossibilityZ of_ Export Eroansion
The scale of the projected import requirements by 1960 represents
an increase in real terms of 31 per cent, compared with the base year,
1954. Now, what is the possibility of oaytng for these imports by
means of normal exports?
As the accompanying table indicates, after World War II, world
trade had recovered its prewar level by 1947 or 19148; at that time
Japan's export trade amounted only to 7,5 per cant of the prewar volumeo
In the process of recovery from this near collapse, the Japanese
exports quite naturally expanded at a very rapid rate, The average
annual rate of growth of 35.5 per cent in the period 19118-1954 (1414 per
cent for the period 1951-1954) far exceeded that of world trade as a
whole, 5,4 per cent (3.7 per cent for 1951-195h), and was only second
to the development of exports from West ern Germany, Of course, this
e 0
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high rate of exports expansion cannot be expected to be maintained
for long after completion of the recovery periodo
But, in one sense, the recovery period cannot be said to be
over for ihe Japanese exports. While, by now, the world exports have
reached a level of 150 on the prewar basis, the exports from Japan
are still less than 50c That is also expressed in the still low
relative share of Japanese exports in the world total of 2.1 per cent,
whereas the prewar share was around 5 per cent, The ratio of exports
to GNP is still far less than 10 per cent compared with 20 per cent
of 1936. Though on the latter point, the same argument can be
applied as that used to justify the low import ratio, there is no
doubt that exports are lagging far behind imports in the Japanese
case, Based on these considerations and in reference to the relatively
high rate of growth that the Japanese export trade displayed before
the war (cf. Table 12A) - the experts of the Economic Planning Board
conclude that, given the development of world trade as a whole at the
annual rate of 2-3 per cent, Japan would be able to count on a growth
of exports at a rate of, say, 6,h per cent. This is actually the
rate of growth on which the present projection of exports is based.
This will mean a 6C per cent increase In exports in the period 195h-
L96o
Forocasting exports is admittedly highly speculative business.,
As we know, exports are determined not only by income levels of
importing countries, but also by relative price situation. And in
most countries, external, rather than internal, factors are more
responsible for fluctuations in trade volume. There has been a
a *
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NET TEPMS OF TRIADE F JAPldl
Prewar Period (1913 C 100)
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
100o2
8940
82,2
72,7
71.4
69.2)/
608
Average
71.1
Postwar Period (193L-36 = 100
1948 94-0
1949 102,2
1950 97.3
19
1952 112,9
1953 116Q
1954 17, 1|
* A
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This involves a question of projection of relative prices, a
field that is hardly exploited theoretically Following are the
factors that may be counted on in making a rough guess for future
price development: technical progress tends to reduce export prices,
whereas improvements in quality tend to increase them, On the side
of imports, only the downward tendency in prices of staple food can
be expected to continue for several years on the basis of presumable
development in supply and demand situation, But in general, we have
no well-established yardstick to project relative prices, say, five
years later0
Now, Table 13 shows that after the war the long-run downward
trend in Japan's terms of trade has definitely been reversed, Very
little can be said about the probable future course of development,
There are, however, rather strong reasons to doubt that the stipulated
expansion of exports from Japan can be achieved without any sacrifice
in terms of trade, In the past, Japan's export drive has always been
associated with deteriorating terms of trade,
50 Problems of Dollar Gap
The problem of Japan's foreign trade is admittedly a difficult
one. But a few words may be reserved for the final point of discussion,
which refers to a problem to which the Japanese planners must devote
constant attention: the dollar gap0  For Japan, this is not only a
real problem, but also an urgent one, since the economic well-being
of a country cannot be based on the apparently transitory dollar
receipts from the U. S. Armry's extraordinary disbursements,
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If the ideal of a free multilateral trade were realised, this
specific problem would, of course, cease to exist; there would remain
only a problem of over-all balancing of tradeo It is precisely
because of the existence of what might be called "structural dis-
equilibrium" in world trade that the projection of Japanese
foreign trade has to be grouped along the specific currency areaso
The same cause represents, at present, obstacles to currency con-
vertibility in the full sense of the word--and such convertibility
would also bring with it the end of the present system of regional
trade discrimination.
The present structure of Japanese trade tends to produce an
export surplus in sterling and open-account areas that would cover
to some extent the large deficits in dollar trade. Under the persistent
pressure toward bilateral balancing, this trade structure is far from
satisfactory In trade relations based on bilateral clearing agree-
ments (open accounts), a possible imbalance is liable to result in
a decline in trade volume. Moreover, a premature attempt at restoring
technical currency convertibility might, under the present conditions,
rather intensify the tendency toward bilateralism; it was one of the
characteristic features of the British-Japanese trade talks of 1955
that the British negotiators consistently tried to liquidate the
sterling surplus accumulated in Japanses hands and insisted on
strict balancing of trade on a bilateral basis0
Even if technical convertibility between the dollar and West
European currencies were restored on a limited scale, the world would
b a *A
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not be relieved from the necessity of regional considerations. A
balanced growth of world trade certainly requires a high degree of
regional adjustment. It is at least questionable whether a country
of large-scale trading can escape from the responsibility of con-
tributing its own share to this goal.
This is the reason why radical adjustment of the trade structure
of Japan is absolutely called for in order to achieve a merely
quantitative expansion of trade. The program of the Economic Planning
Board is to promote exports into the dollar areas on the one hand
and to shift imports as much as possible from the dollar to other
sources, on the other. This inlies that imports would be
accelerated from the sierling as well as open-accounts areas at the
expense of imports from the dollar areas£ that also trade with the
mainland of China would receive increased attention, Japan's trade
with China presently amounts to only less than 2 per cent of the
Japanese trade, as compared with much more than 15 per cent in the
prewar years, This course of action might be necessitated by purely
economic motives, unless Japan's dollar-earning exports can be increased
to the most improbable scale.
Is, then, the strict balance in each currency trade area within
the limits of feasibility? In a preliminary calculation of the
Economic Planning Board, full success was assumed for this policy of
trade adjustments, with the projected result that the relative weight
of the dollar trade in Japan's foreign transactions by 1960 would
decline by 11 per cent, whereas those of the sterling and open-accounts
trade would increase respectively by 9 per cent and 2 per cento Sub-
sequently, however, it was found that this line of policy would come
37
up against almost insurmountable difficulties,
If strict balance is to be achieved in open-accounts trade,
for instance, the possible exports of heavy industrial products to,
say, Argentina, Indonesia, etco, would be short of the potentiality
by nearly $80 million, As for the dollar imports, the feasibility
of shift toward non-dollar sources is rather limited by technological
and economic factors0 On the other hand, there is no prospect of
the Japanese exports being increased enough in the dollar areas to
pay the necessary basic imports0 According to an estimate, Japan's
imports from the dollar areas could not be cut by 1960 below the level
of 1,060 million a year, even with the utmost change in the regional
structure,of its imports, The imports from the U. S. A, alone would
then amount to 75o million. But the maximum possible exports to the
U1 S. A. cannot be estimated at more than $650 million, leaving a gap
of $100 million..
This is the magnitude of what I called the real and inescapable
problem of the dollar gap in the present projection of foreign trade
Even assuming that technical currency convertibility were by 1960
re-established on a limited scale, the future horizon of Japanese
trade would be troubled by this prospect. Again, here we are con-
fronted with the same kind of structural problem which dominates the
long-range projection of the Japanese economye
